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Now then, to return to Ernest v. Schmidt1 and the application of
206.17 (Sec. 2609, Laws of 1915). Cannot we substitute it in the
above opinion for Sec. 2603? If there can be a joitider of parties where
the recovery against one is inconsistent with recovery as against the
other, why cannot there be a joinder of the defendants? Cannot Sec.
260.17 be classed with Sec. 260.11 The decision on the rehearing of
Ernest v. Schmidt seems to answer these questions in the affirmative;
and when looking at in in conjunction with the opinion in De Groot v.
Peoples Bank the rule as apparently laid by the Supreme Court, is that
See. 263.04 is a general statute applying to all cases where relief is
sought and the obligations of the charged parties are not as defined by
Sec. 260.11 and Sec. 260.17.
FRANCIs ACKERMAN
Pledges: Pledge Agreements: Jury Questions.
In the action of Rezash V. Bank of Two Rivers1 the appellant desired
to recover of the respondent bank $7,000 and interest alleged to have
been lost by the negligence of the bank in its handling of a security of
appellant pledged to the bank.
Appellant on August 15, 1925, delivered to the bank, as collateral
security for a line of credit extended by the bank to him, an interim
receipt from an investment house in Chicago, by which the investment
company undertook to deliver to the appellant $7,000 worth of speci-
fied building bonds. The bank at the same time prepared a pledge
agreement describing the collateral, and, as the interim receipt expressly
provided that it was to be surrendered on delivery of the bonds, in-
corporated in the pledge agreement an authorization to the bank to
surrender the interim receipt for the permanent bonds,-which appel-
lant signed. The bank requested no other or further authority than
what it incorporated in the pledge agreement.
The whole transaction was for the benefit of the appellant. The
bank received no consideration because of it.
By the terms of the interim receipt, the said investment company
undertook to deliver $7,000 worth of the specified building bonds, "when
as and if received in definite form". The bank concededly never made
an inquiry to ascertain when the bonds became available in a deliverable
state. The uncontroverted fact was that the bonds had been put into
a deliverable state August 1, 1925, by the common modern device of
trustee's interim certificates and that practically all of the seven mil-
lion dollar issue was in the first instance sold and delivered in that form;
'227 N.W. Vol. 1, p. 26 (advance sheets).
'227 N.W. 4; - Wis. -.
NOTES AND COMMENT
and the investment company, during the two months following the
pledge, was actively engaged in business and actually received and de-
livered $37,000 principal amount of the specified kind of bonds in the
form of trustee's interim certificates.
The said investment company thereafter went into the hands of a
receiver November 2, 1925, without having delivered anything under
the interim receipt-the bank concededly having done nothing what-
ever meanwhile to secure delivery by the investment company, except
that on the day of the pledge it wrote a letter to the investment com-
pany giving notice that the interim receipt had been pledged to it and
that the bonds, when ready, should be accordingly delivered to it.
The defense was (a) that the bank owed appellant no duty except
to safely keep the interim receipt until the investment company sent
the permanent bonds; and that it handled this interim receipt for ap-
pellant in the same way as it had always handled its own, and this was
reasonable care and absolved it from liability; (b) but that if it had
nevertheless owed appellant any duty to do anything toward procuring
delivery when delivery was due, that the definite or permanent bonds
were not, as it turned out, available for delivery until after the receiver-
ship of the investment company and that all it could have required of
the investment company under the language of the interim receipt,
was the delivery of definitive bonds-that it could not demand of the
investment company that it deliver trustee's interim certificates which
were available in August, September, and October, 1925-so that the
exercise of care by the bank in this regard would have been futile;
and besides, (c) the pledge agreement which it drafted and appellant
signed, and by which appellant granted all the authority the bank asked,
and which authorized the bank to surrender the interim receipt for
"permanent" bonds, was tantamount to an instruction by appellant
to the bank forbidding it to take anything but permanent bonds in ex-
change for the interim receipt-so its hands were tied by appellants
and they cannot complain of the bank's failure to procure trustee's
interim certificates.
The trial court adopted the construction both of the interim receipt
and of the pledge agreement contended for by the bank, and granted
judgment in its favor.
The supreme court in affirming his decision and considering whether
the bank was negligent in complying with its contractual obligation to
the appellant held, that:
1. "Pledgee, in absence of express agreement to the contrary, must
exercise for the protection of the pledged property that degree of care
which an ordinary careful and prudent man bestows on his own prop-
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erty, or affairs of a like nature and under like circumstances, and failure
to do so in negligence, for which pledgee is responsible." 2
2. "A pledge agreement is to be interpreted and enforced like other
contracts, in order to carry out the intent of the parties.
3. "Whether pledgee of interim receipt for bonds was negligent in
not procuring delivery of bonds or trustee's certificates where seller
of bonds failed before permanent bonds were deliverey held for the
jury."
EARL J. O'BRIEN
Rate Maling: Public Utilities.
McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Company (272 U. S. 400) (47 Sup.
Ct. 144).
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the now famous
O'Fallon Railroad Case has directed the attention of lawyers and
the public in general, as investors and consumers, to the state of the
law in the field of rate-making for public service companies, and the
crux of this interest is an attempt to discover a valid, workable method
which may be used to evaluate such companies.
A typical case on this phase of the law is McCardle v. Indianapolis
Water Company, supra, in which the Water Company sought an in-
junction restraining .McCardle as a member of the Public Service
Commission of Indiana, from enforcing water-rates established by
that body, for the reason that such rates did not yield an adequate
return on the capital invested. The suit was brought in the Federal
District Court of Indiana, resort to the federal court being had on the
ground that the rates in question were so inadequate that they resulted
in a confiscation of property, "without due process of law," in oppo-
sition to the Fourteenth Amendment. The public Service Commission
(McCardle et al) in company with the City of Indianapolis, which
had intervened, appealed from a decree in favor of the Water Com-
pany. The sole question presented for the consideration of the court
was the proper method of determining the value of the Water Com-
pany's property. The Commission submitted valuations made by its
own engineers and the company submitted like reports made by two
different firms of valuation engineers, each of these estimates differing
by at least $1,000,000 from the others.
The Supreme Court sustained the decree of the District Court but de-
cided the findings below were not as "specific as good practice re-
221 R. C. L., 664 et seq.; Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, McLemore v.
Bank, 91 U. S. 27, 23 L. Ed. 43 Wis. 329: 196.
1279 U. S. 461.
